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STUDENT NOTES
JOHN LOCKE'S THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
AND FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS: A PROPOSAL FOR UNDERSTANDING
I. INTRODUCTION
The function of the United States Constitution is to proscribe
governmental power. It limits not only the power of the separate
governmental branches with respect to each other, but also limits
the power of government to affect the conduct of private individ-
uals. This article will focus on the latter limiting function, that
is, the body of law that interprets the constitutional limits of gov-
ernmental activity as it affects individual rights.
Formidable questions are raised when the government acts
to curtail an individual's freedom to engage in conduct for which
no textual constitutional guarantee exists, yet for which constitu-
tional protection is sought.' Once it is resolved that the constitu-
tion does protect certain conduct from governmental interference
despite the lack of a textual basis,2 it becomes possible to build
a theory of these unwritten personal freedoms.
The degree of freedom allowed by the constitution can be bet-
ter understood by reference to the political theory under which
the constitution was formed. In general, this article will expose
these root ideas of constitutional liberty, connect them with ex-
isting constitutional law in special areas of asserted liberty, and
by extrapolation, provide new ways to understand protection of
that liberty. In particular, it will show a conceptual similarity
between cases protecting the free exercise of religion, and the
cases protecting privacy, or "substantive due process rights,"3
under various guarantees of the constitution, especially where such
' See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L. J. 920 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
1 See notes 92 & 160 infra and accompanying text.
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cases are found on essentially indentical conduct by the individual.
An examination of the political theory underlying the text of
the constitution will show that certain liberty claims should be ac-
corded constitutional protection even though such claims do not
fit neatly into the categories traditionally accorded such protec-
tion. An expanded definition of the right of privacy will be shown
to merge conceptually with certain free exercise cases. In essence
a proper understanding of constitutional law depends on viewing
it as monolithic, and not as a mixture of diverse rights.
This article does not examine or criticize the legal analysis
courts actually use in deciding issues of constitutional law. It mere-
ly articulates a theory of our constitutional system, and the way
in which that theory may color how we think of a constitutional
liberty case.
II. POLITICAL THEORY, PRIVACY, AND FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION
A. Political Theory of the Constitution-The Thought of
John Locke
The constitution is deeply indebted to the thought of John
Locke.4 In fact, his philosophy has served as its foundation. The
founders of the American constitution were greatly influenced by
classical liberalism,5 and its fundamental principle of individualism.'
In a political sense the philosophy of individualism means that
government should be created to protect the individual, not the
other way around. Since the political philosophy of John Locke
L.B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 82; LEVY, OUR CONSTITUTION: TOOL
OR TESTAMENT? 172 (1965); BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 49-50 (1974); RICHARDS, THE
MORAL CRITICISM OF LAw 41 (1977).
1 B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 599 (1945) [hereinafter cited
as RUSSELL]; "Decades of highly varied use ... have robbed 'liberalism' of much
of its specific meaning. In its early classic usage, liberalism ... implied primacy
for the individual and strict limitations on governments to ensure full freedom
for the individual to serve his needs as he saw fit." K. DOLBEARE & P. DOLBEARE,
AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES 38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DOLBEARE].
I Id. See also COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL (1946).
7 J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 164 (Ernest Rhys ed. 1924 [hereinafter cited
as CIVIL GOVERNMENT]; See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943).
[Vol. 84
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espoused this very notion,8 the founding fathers turned to John
Locke for guidance. Locke's theory of government postulates that
societies in their original condition comprised only individuals,
without government. Individuals in this "state of nature"9 pos-
sessed certain inherent rights and liberties which existed inde-
pendently of government."° In the state of nature one's conduct
was governed by natural law," not by governmentally created,
or positive law.
Locke explained that the state of nature was "inconvenient"
and provided an inadequate guarantee of individuals' inherent
rights and liberties. 2 Thus, Locke thought, at some distant point
in the past 3 individuals in the state of nature decided that they
could best preserve their paramount interests in property and
personal liberty by forming a government to protect these inher-
ent interests." This formation of government, which Locke called
the social contract,15 required that individuals in the state of nature
surrender a part of their natural freedom to government in ex-
change for the government's obligation to protect the natural
rights of individuals."
Since the government formed by the social contract was by
the consent of the governed, it had power to rule only to the
extent that it acted within the limits imposed on it by the very
DOLBEARE, supra note 5, at 38.
CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 7; SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY
& NARRATIVE HISTORY 43-44 (1980).
10 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), where it was observed
by the Court that the right of privacy antedates the Bill of Rights and other
deeply rooted social institutions. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 553 (1875) and Culp v. United States, 131- F.2d 93, 98 (8th Cir. 1942), where
it is noted that fundamental rights exist independently of any constitutional
provision.
" CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 118; SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 81 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIGMUND].
2 SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 85.
13 It is not certain whether Locke actually believed the state of nature to
have been historic reality, or merely an illustrative hypothesis. RUSSELL, supra
note 5, at 263. Lord Russell professes to be "afraid that Locke thought it to have
been an historical fact." Id.
" The difficulty with preservation of individual rights in the state of nature
was that every man was the judge of his own cause when there arose a conflict
with another. There was no neutral entity to which one could turn for resolution
of conflicts, CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 180, hence the need for govern-
ment, SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 85.
" RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 631.
18 Id. See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
1982]
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reason it was created:17 to preserve the "lives, liberties, and estates
of individuals."18 This is of course consonant with the importance
Locke placed on individual liberty, but more significantly, fore-
shadows the concept of limited government embraced by the
founders of the constitution. 9 In fact the exaltation of individual
liberty," and limited government are two sides of the same coin.
The difficulty of constitutional law is interpreting the social con-
tract, that is, deciding where the powers of government end
and the liberty of the individual begins.
In his political model, Locke placed the bulk of governmental
power in the legislative body." The legislature represented the
power surrendered by the people in the formation of the social
contract. As such its acts were limited by the range of power given
to it by the people. Where the legislature overstepped its pre-
scribed powers and interfered with an individual's freedom to act,
Locke envisioned that the individual could resort to the judicial
branch of government for relief.' Today, this dynamic remains
the model for resolving issues of constitutional liberty.
17 SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 84-85.
" Locke said the sole purpose of men's putting themselves under govern-
ment is the "preservation of property:' CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 180.
He simultaneously reminds that "property" is to be understood as the "lives,
liberties, and estates of individuals:' Id. Thus understood, there can be no objec-
tion to Locke's thought as being applicable only to narrow notions of property
per se, even though he does seem preoccupied with it. RUSSELL, supra note 5, at
627. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) where the Court
interpreted the applicability of the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. S 1983
and noted that "the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights
is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property .... no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is
in truth a 'personal' right.... In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists be-
tween the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning with the other. [This] has long been recognized. J. LOCKE
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 82-85 ... " See also SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL
THEORY 86 (19711; Hamilton, Property-According to Locke 41 YALE L.J. 864 (1932).
" See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) where liberty is recognized
as essential to the political structure of the government, and the role of govern-
ment seen to consist in curtailing only the violent exercise of liberty.
I See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
21 CIVIL GOVERNMENT supra note 7, at 192.
2 RUSSELL, supra note 5 at 630; Thomas Jefferson wrote: "what I disapproved
of from the first moment ... was the want of a bill of rights to guard liberty
against the legislative as well as executive branches of government. In the argu-
ment in favor of a declaration [bill] of rights, you omit one which has great weight
with me, the legal check it puts into the hands of the judiciary." Letters from
Thomas Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson & James Madison (March 13 & March
15, 1789), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IXV 650, 659 (J. Boyd
[Vol. 84
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It should come as no surprise that constitutional liberty can
be analyzed in terms of the thought of an eighteenth century
political philosopher. Locke's thought pervades the constitution;2
Locke's thought, the constitution, and constitutional law itself are
but statements on the individual's relationship to government. It
seems only natural that a judge faced with a constitutional law
issue should consider Locke's influence as a guide to his decision-
making because in a real sense a judge faced with a constitutional
issue must himself act as a political philosopher.
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
Since 1965, when the Supreme Court decided Griswold v.
Connecticut,' the nation's courts have experienced an explosion
of litigation in which individuals have pressed claims of personal
liberty to engage in a particular course of conduct in the face of
governmental interference. The Court in Griswold failed to ar-
ticulate a clear basis for its ruling that the use of contraceptives
was constitutionally protected from governmental interference.
The Court proclaimed the right to be one of privacy, which derived
ed. 1958); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); McLaughlin, WhatHas theSupreme
Court Taught? Part 1 72 W. VA. L. REv. 326, 347 (1970).
23 BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 49-50 (1974); Compare CIVIL GOVERNMENT,
supra note 7, at 190 with THE FEDERALIST No 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison); See
also Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 273, 276 (1966).
24 L. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 184 (1979). Consider the following from the United
States Supreme Court, in which the Court indulged in a bit of political theory:
There are ... rights in every free government beyond the control of
the state. A government which recognized no such rights, which held
the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times
to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most
democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism ... There
are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature
of all free governments, implied reservations of individual rights, without
which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by
all governments entitled to the name.
This Lockean passage is found in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 U.S. (Wall.) 655, 66-63
(1875). See also Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (S. DalI.) 386, 388-89 (1798).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Notes, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection of Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 670 (1973); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 495 (1980); J. Weiss & S.
Wizner, Pot, Prayer, Politics and Privacy: The Right to Cut Your Own Throat
in Your Ou Way, 54 IowA L. REV. 709 (1969); Note, The California Marijuana
Possession Statute: An Infringement on the Right of Privacy or Other Peripheral
Constitutional Rights?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 758 (1968); Comments on the Griswold Case,
64 MICHIGAN L. REV. 197 (1965).
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from "penumbras of' or "emanations from" the various guarantees
of the Bill of Rights." The two concurrences relied on the ninth
amendment' and the due process clause" respectively, to buttress
the Court's decision to immunize the constitutional claimant's
conduct.
Supreme Court cases after Griswold have explained the source
of the right of privacy no more clearly. Privacy has been viewed
as a compendium of rights, as in Griswold, and has been seen as
an aspect of the "liberty" protected by the due process clause."
It has also been seen as a "shadow" of the rights protected by
the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments,"' and on one occa-
sion the Court even relied on the preamble to the constitution
as a justification for extending privacy rights.2
Regardless of the labels attached to the right, the result has
been the same: certain conduct has been left to individual deci-
sionmaking and is not allowed to be supplanted by governmental
action. The Supreme Court' as well as certain of the lower fed-
eral courts" have acknowledged that privacy is in essence the
right to make certain kinds of important decisions without state
interference. 5
381 U.S. 479, 484.
2 Id. at 486.
1 Id. at 499. Justice Harlan felt that the "Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment stands ...on its own bottom." Id. at 500.
Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
3, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977).
s Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (concurring opinion); At least one
commentary has suggested that the "spirit" of the constitution, if not the text
of the constitution, justifies the right to privacy. Wilkinson & White, Constitu-
tional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563,611-13 (1977). For
a portrait of a court troubled by the lack of a textual basis in the constitution
for the right of privacy, see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981).
s Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Lovisi v. Slayton,
363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), affld, 539 F.2d 349 (4th cir. 1976), cert. denied
sub nom., Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1977).
1 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600; J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087
(6th Cir. 1981); Lovisi v. Slaton 363 F. Supp. 620, 625, Laurence Tribe has cogent-
ly articulated this idea. Tribe has written that in Roe v. Wade, a typical privacy case,
The Court was not, after all, choosing simply between the alternatives
of abortion and continued pregnancy. It was instead choosing among alter-
native allocations of decisionmaking authority, for the issue it faced was
whether the woman and her doctor, rather than an agency of govern-
ment, should have the authority to make the abortion decision at various
[Vol. 84
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When one thinks of constitutional privacy as a sphere of in-
dependent decisionmaking, one is freed from the narrow concep-
tion of privacy as a right to do a particular act behind closed
doors. 8 Moreover, thinking of privacy as a right to make personal
decisions without interference helps understand the early Supreme
Court fundamental rights cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska" and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,38 where the Court seized on the word
"liberty" in the due process clause, and extrapolated from it an
unwritten constitutional right of parents to govern their children's
upbringing 9 Those cases did not involve the mere right to act
freely in the privacy of one's home, rather, they involved the
broader right to govern private behavior.
In this context, privacy can be seen as flowing from the con-
cept of Lockean individualism on which the scheme of constitu-
tional liberty rests. As a matter of common sense, the capacity
to make independent an untrammeled decisions is the hallmark
or personal autonomy." A moment's reflection reveals that indi-
vidualistic liberty of Locke's political order is closely and necessar-
ily related to the modern version of the constitutional right of
privacy."'
For purposes of actual case decisions it would not seem to
make any difference what a court refers to when it holds private
stages of pregnancy. the appellant's argument in Roe was not that the
Court should decide "for abortion," but rather that the Court should
transfer te role of decisionmaker from the government to the woman
herself. Despite what the Court's opinion seemed to say, the result it
reached was not the simple "substitution of one non-rational judgment
for another concerning the relative importance of a mother's opportunity
to live the life she has planned and a fetus's opportunity to live at all,"
but was instead a decision about who should make judgments of that sort.
(emphasis in original) (Footnote omitted)
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1973).
S8 See Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 273, 279 (1966); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(dissenting opinion).
-" 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 (1978). [hereinafter cited
as TRIBE].
11 Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699;
Eichbaum, Toward an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond
the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. CIr. R.-Civ. L. L. REV. 361 (1979).
41 Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970) (suggesting a
unitary liberty from which constitutional rights derive).
1982]
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conduct constitutionally immune from governmental interference.
For instance, it would make little difference if in Griswold the
majority of the Court had said that the right to use contracep-
tives was protected not by penumbras or of emanations from the
Bill of Rights, but rather by the liberty of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. 2
Only under definitions of privacy that refer exclusively to the
right to do certain acts behind closed doors,43 or to control the
amount and kind of information disclosed about oneself,4 would
there be a different result in the decisions a court would reach.
These definitions of privacy are much narrower than the defini-
tions used in Griswold, Roe v. Wade, 5 Whalen v. Roe" and certain
lower federal court cases. 7 Since the court in these latter cases
has employed the broader definitions, it is understandable that
they have reached similar conclusions. The broader definitions of
privacy incorporates the concept of personal autonomy which the
Supreme Court has called the "sphere of independent decision-
making." This broader definition is also closer conceptually to
the expansive idea of liberty envisioned by the founders of the
constitution when the American "social contract" was first drawn
up in 1787.8
Therefore, it reasonably can be said that the comparatively
recent right of privacy created by the Supreme Court finds its
roots in the political theory of the constitution as espoused by
Locke. Although as a practical matter it may be true that "the
precise source of the right of privacy is not as important as the
42 The Court seems to think that privacy cases such as Roe v. Wade 381 U.S.
479 (1965), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) were not based on "substantive
due process," a rubric commonly associated with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 212 n.4 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). It is
difficult to dispute that what went on in Roe under the aegis of privacy very
much resembles what went on in cases like Locher. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 265-69 (1977). See also Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 937-43 (1973); Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let
Alone, 1976 DUKE L. J. 699,712; Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (laying
to rest any suggestion that the court still adhers to the Lochner doctrine.)
41 See note 36 supra.
1 A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977).
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
,3 See note 34, supra.
48 RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 633.
[Vol. 84
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fact that [the Court in Griswold] found such a right to exist, 9
doctrinal clarity requires it be understood that the right is not
something which came into existence only with Griswold; rather,
as Justice Douglas thought, the "right of privacy [is] older than
the Bill of Rights."' From such a view it becomes evident that
the intellectual baggage carried by the founders of the constitu-
tion, is the fountainhead of the judicially created right of privacy.
"[E]very man has a 'property' in his own 'person'. This nobody
has any right to but himself."1 The Lockean conception has been
reinforced, usually sub silentio, by the procession of constitutional
privacy decisions since Griswod.1 "[A]s Locke would say, [privacy
is] the kind of 'property'" with respect to which its owner has
delegated no power to the state.' 'M
C. Free Exercise of Religion: Privacy Implications of the
Functional Definition of Religion
The first amendment to the constitution protects the free ex-
ercise of religion.' This right has been made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. Certain cases in which free
exercise claims have been advanced bear a close analytical rela-
tionship to certain cases in which the constitutional right of privacy
has been asserted. 7 The closeness of this theoretical relationship
rests primarily on the discussion set forth above about the
Lockean governmental dynamic and its exaltation of individual
liberty.
This article considers two types of free exercise cases. The
first type involves the issue of what constitutes a religion for the
" Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 229
(1965).
' 381 U.S. 479, 486; See aiso Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 169 (1973); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of appeal).
", Supra note 7, at 130. For a discussion of Locke's conception of property,
see note 18 supra and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 272, 276 (1966).
See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
Konvitz, supra note 52, at 280 Cf. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitu-
tion: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843,
859-60 (1978).
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof," U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
See generally, TRIBE, supra note 39, at 884-85.
19821
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purposes of constitutional protection.58 Recent judicial pro-
nouncements on the contours of the constitutional meaning of
religion raise interesting questions with respect to whether con-
duct not ordinarily thought of as "religious" may conceivably be
accorded constitutional protection on grounds other than free exer-
cise.59 The second type of case involves plaintiffs whose conduct
is such as may be held protectable either by the free exercise
clause or by the constitutional right of privacy.c"
The free exercise cases demonstrate that certain species of
religious based conduct can be viewed persuasively as the kind
of conduct that would or should be held protectable by the consti-
tutional right of privacy. This presumes: 1) an expanded defini-
tion of the right of privacy, 1 traceable to the Lockean govern-
' Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056
(1978). Note, Defining Religion: Of God, The Constitution, and the D.A.R., 32 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533 (1965).
1 An interesting illustration of the conceptual similarity between religious
and political beliefs is contained in Bertrand Russell's A HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY (1945). Russell argues that Marxism and Christianity are doctrinally
indistinguishable. Writing in connection with the idea that the theme of certain
religious and political doctrines is "such as to make a powerful appeal to the
oppressed and unfortunate of all times," Russell observed that "Saint Augustine
[one of the fathers of Christianity] adapted this [theme] to Christianity, Marx
to Socialism. To understand Marx, [and by implication, Christianity] one should
use the following dictionary:
Yahweh = Dialectical Materialism
The Messiah = Marx
The Elect = The Proletariat
The Church = The Communist Party
The Second Coming = The Revolution
Hell = Punishment of the Capitalists
The Millennium = The Communist Commonwealth
The terms on the left give the emotional content of the terms on the right, and
it is this emotional content, familiar to those who have had a Christian ... up-
bringing, that makes Marx's eschatology credible B RUSSELL," A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY at 363-64. Russell's parallels are unconventional but plausi-
ble. They are important because they illustrate just how difficult it is to say
what a religion is for a constitutional or any other purpose. See Thomas v. Review
Bd of Ind. Employment Sec., 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1430 (1981); See also Boyan, Defining
Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968).
1 Cf. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) with Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Cf. Stevens v. Burger, 428 F.Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
61 W.O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87 (1958):
Government exists for man, not man for government. The aim of govern-
ment is security for the individual and freedom for the development
[Vol. 84
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mental dynamic described above,62 and 2) an expanded constitu-
tional definition of religion' for free exercise purposes, to be
developed in this section of the article.
In 1890, the Supreme Court adopted a theistic definition of
religion. It held that for religious conduct to be protected under
the free exercise clause it must have some reference to a supreme
deity.64 Traces of this view were visible as late as 1951.5 With
the advent of the Second World War the lower federal courts
began to reassess their position on the constitutional meaning of
religion. Perhaps out of a realization of American society's ex-
treme cultural variety, substantial inroads were made on the pure-
ly theistic definition that then held sway. As a matter of analysis,
it would also be correct to say that the federal courts did not
really abandon a theistic definition and embrace a non-theistic one,
but rather, they merely expanded their idea of what may con-
stitute a deity for purposes of the theism requirement. In any
event, it was with the conscientious objector cases that the
changes first became apparent.6
In United States v. Ballard' and West Virginia Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnetter8 the Supreme Court itself greatly changed the
contours of the protection afforded by the free exercise clause
by adjusting the definition of religion. In Ballard, the Court was
confronted by a group challenging mail fraud convictions as vio-
of his talents. The individual needs protection from government itself-
from the executive branch, from the legislative branch, and even from
the tyranny of judges. The Framers of the Constitution realized this
and undertook to establish safeguards and guarantees. Some of these
concern the procedure that must be followed if government undertakes
to move against the citizen. Others concern substantive rights such as
freedom of religion and freedom of assembly.
There is indeed a congeries of these rights that may conveniently
be called the right to be let alone. They concern the right of privacy-
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in the Constitution. This right
of privacy protects freedom of religion and freedom of conscience.
(emphasis added).
See notes 9-18 supra and accompanying text.
See note 58 supra.
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1951).
See, e.g., United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943; contra is
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
67 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940).
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lative of the free exercise clause. 9 Justice Douglas writing for
the Court noted that the free exercise clause precludes any in-
quiry into the truth or falsity of one's religion." The Court ex-
pressly recognized that what may be religion to one may be heresy
to another. 1 In Barnette, it held that the constitution prohibited
the government from coercing adherence to any belief. Specifical-
ly, the Court stated that "if there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."73 The upshot of these decisions was that the
parameters of what constituted a religion for purposes of free ex-
ercise protection were judicially and constitutionally uncertain.
The Court was trying to apply legal standards to a fact pattern
that defied rules.
These developments set the stage for a series of decisions in
the 1960s which further evidenced an expansion of the scope of
allegedly religious-based conduct for which constitutional protec-
tion could be asserted. In Torcaso v. Watkins74 the Court held
violative of the free exercise clause the State of Maryland's refusal
to give the plaintiff a notary public commission (for which he was
otherwise qualified) because he would not profess a belief in God.
Torcaso marked the Court's first application of the free exercise
clause to the belief of atheism. The rejection of theism was itself
a belief entitled to free exercise protection. By way of dictum the
Court suggested in Torcaso that systems of belief such a "Bud-
dhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others"
were entitled to free exercise protection.
75
"' 322 U.S. at 79. Defendant's alleged crime was organizing and promoting
their religion through the mails. The United States charged that the group used
"false means, and fraudulent representations and premises" in the process of
organizing and promoting. Thus the defendants' religious freedom was directly
at stake. Id.
71 Id. at 86.
1, Id. Compare West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
319 U.S. 624, 642.
7Id.
7' 367 U.S. 488 (1961). See also Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (held
unconstitutional to deny plaintiff a job at a state university for his refusal to
sign an oath certifying that he had no plans to overthrow the government.)
'- Id. at 495 n.11.
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United States v. Seegere and Welsh v. United States77 were
logical extensions of Toreaso. These cases demonstrated that the
Supreme Court had adopted a "functional" definition of religion
for free exercise purposes.7 1 In Welsh, a case with facts practially
identical to Seeger,79 the Court followed Seeger and held that the
claimant's allegedly religious-based conduct deserved constitu-
tional protection if in the claimant's life the convictions or beliefs
on which the conduct is based "function as a religion."' This
theoretical shift has not gone unnoticed by the lower federal
courts.8
The effect of the functional definition of religion is to enlarge
substantially the kinds of conduct for which constitutional protec-
tion may be available. "Thus interpreted, the free exercise clause
becomes a charter for personal autonomy in matters"' where con-
duct is based on a belief or value which operates in the claimant's
life as a "source of being, of... ultimate concern."''
The kinds of conduct which under the new definition of religion
could merit free exercise protection are perhaps surprising. How-
ever, the assertion that free exercise protection must, consistent-
ly with the Seeger-Welsh analysis, be extended, is not unreasonable.
For example, given the nature of the beliefs held by a fervent
Marxist, it can be soundly argued that conduct based on such
beliefs is entitled to free exercise protection. Clearly the function
of Marxism in the life of a Marxist parallels the function of Chris-
tianity in the life of a Christian." The ramifications of this develop-
ment have yet to be discussed directly by the courts but have
been dealt with by commentators.
78 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056
(1978). Although Seeger and Welsh are arguably statutory decisions of non-
constitutional dimensions, federal courts have had no difficulty in treating them
as precedent for free exercise decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 297
F.Supp. 902, 909 (D. Mass. 1967). See also Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683
n.4 (9th Cir. 1981).
7 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970).
Id. at 340; Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187; See also supra note 81, at 1072.
81 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1289 (D.N.J. 1977), affid, 592 F.2d 197, 200
(3d Cir. 1978) (concurring opinion).
2 See Note, supra note 78 at 1089.
- 380 U.S. 163, 187, quoting, P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS
57 (1944).
" See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms,
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It takes little imagination to see the theoretical overlap" with
respect to the conduct protected by the free exercise clause, and
that protected by certain privacy cases, specifically those involv-
ing governmental attempts to shape the mind and beliefs of an
individual." The enlarged definition of religion suggests that the
free exercise guarantee is part of the broader right of privacy
implicit in the overall scheme of constitutional liberty.' Moreover,
the convergence of the free exercise and privacy rights implies
that those rights are in reality only integral portions of a mon-
olithic liberty implicit in the Lockean theory of government.
There are certain sets of cases in which virtually identical
conduct has been claimed constitutionally protected under dif-
ferent theories,® and with few exceptions, held to be so protected.9"
A discussion of these cases will illustrate the unitary, holistic
nature of constitutional liberty, which could be judicially recog-
nized despite potential difficulty of fitting the particular conduct
within a category traditionally accorded constitutional protection.,
1. The Right to Control the Quality of One's Consciousness -
Drug Use
In People v. Woody,93 the Supreme Court of California held
116 U. PA. L.REv. 479(1968); Stahmer, DefiningReligio:FederalAidandAcademic
Freedom, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER, 116, 128-29 (D. Gianella ed. 1963).
' See e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981).
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 n.2 (1977); West Virginia Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 901 n.15.
' See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521-39 (1961) (Douglas & Harlan, JJ., dis-
senting from the Court's dismissal of the appeal); See also TRIBE, supra note 39,
at 884-85.
1 See notes 4-18 supra and accompanying text. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting): This "liberty" is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property, the freedom of speech,
press, and religion; ... and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speak-
ing, is a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints.
10 The theories being free exercise of religion, and the constitutional right
of privacy.
,' In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court rejected the privacy claim.
See TRIBE, supra, note 39, at 884-85.
' 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964) (en ban); See also Native
Am. Church v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd uithout pub-
lished opinion, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980); See also State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz.
App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973); Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. 1977);
contra State ex rel. Scott v. County, 117 W. Va. 788, 187 S.E.2d 119 (1972).
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that members of the Native American Church of California had
a constitutional right to use peyote in their religious services under
the free exercise clause irrespective of state criminal statutes pro-
scribing such drug use. The right to use peyote was upheld
because the practice was central to the claimants' religion94 and
because their religion was a bona fide one."
In Ravin v. State9 the Supreme Court of Alaska declared the
constitutional right of privacy to encompass the right to use mari-
juana in one's home. Several other state supreme courts have
followed suitY These decisions are premised on the idea that other-
wise "criminal" acts, when done in one's home, take on a dignity
beyond the efficacy of government to regulate.98
There is obviously a common theme in these cases where
essentially the same conduct was held to be protected by the con-
stitution, albeit on different grounds. If it is true that "[o]ur whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds,"99 then it is reasonably clear
that the claims of liberty at stake in cases such as these trans-
cend the labels of "free exercise of religion" or "privacy." Rather,
the right at stake in these cases appears to be the right of the
individual to control his consciousness or psychological make-up.
Thus viewed, the right goes beyond the free exercise of religion
or the concept of privacy, and is susceptible to being thought of
as a fundamental right to govern one's- identity.'
Under this analysis of personal liberty, the right to use drugs,
whether under the banner of free exercise TM or privacy"' could
be a right upheld as a direct function of the unitary concept of
liberty inherent in the constitution and the political theory on
which it is based. The free exercise and privacy rights can thus
be seen as manifestations of constitutional liberty but not
themselves as sources of it." 3
9' 61 Cal.2d 716, 720, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73, 394 P.2d 813, 817.
95 Id.
9 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
"T See e.g., People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d 388, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971); People
v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.E.2d 878 (1972).
"1 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
' Id. at 565.
1o West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). See upra
note 87.
'0' U.S. CONST. amend. L
,02 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
'o See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Given the principles underlying the right of privacy, govern-
mental attempts to proscribe drug use are not very defensible.
This is especially apparent when one compares drug cases with
other cases involving private conduct intended to influence one's
perceptions and consciousness. It is true enough that nearly all
cases have upheld the government's right to regulate drug use;'" at
the same time it is true that most cases have forbidden the govern-
ment from attempting to regulate the content of one's reading
materials."5 This is somewhat difficult to reconcile when one con-
siders that in either situation the conduct involves an individual
decision to determine the content and direction of one's mental
processes.
Laurence Tribe has illustrated this inconsistency in his
writings. Commenting on Stanley v. Georgia"5 which involved one's
right to privately possess pornographic material,"'7 Tribe wrote:
If the Stanleys of the world could obtain from a new drug called
obscenamine the sensation that Stanley in fact obtained from
the obscene film whose possession Georgia sought unsuccessfully
to make a crime, one might expect a legislative attempt to make
possession or use of obscenamine a criminal offense. 10
What functional distinction is there between one's reading
material and the substances one chooses to ingest? If there is any,
it is the degree of "harm" caused to the individual, measured
perhaps by physical effects. This is however an unsound distinc-
tion because there are some substances one may lawfully use, but
which are at least as physically harmful as other substances
uniformly proclaimed unlawful to use or possess."9 Thus constitu-
tionally, not to mention logically, the conduct is in essence in-
distinguishable. Proscriptive drug laws"1 0 seem as vulnerable to
constitutional attack as laws regulating one's reading material.
11 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 n.11 (1969); See also Wolkind
v. Selph, 495 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Va. 1980); National Organization for Reform of
Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C. 1980).
'05 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
106 Id.
Id. at 565.
'0' TRIBE, supra note 39, at 910.
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513 n.72; Weiss v. Wizner, Pot, Prayer,
Politics and Privacy: The Right to Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54
IOWA L. REv. 709, 723 (1968).
"' Note, The California Marijuana Possession Statute: An Infringement on
the Right of Privacy or other Peripheral Constitutional Rights? 19 HASTINGS L.J.
758 (1968).
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The important point is that if there is no sound factual distinc-
tion between these types of conduct (drug use and other conduct
routinely protected under the constitution) then there should like-
wise be no acceptable distinction between the rights used to pro-
tect one's liberty to engage in such conduct. This is especially
clear when one remembers that 1) in free exercise cases, the
Supreme Court has unequivocally adopted the functional defini-
tion of religion, which in many circumstances works to protect
conduct bearing little resemblance to common notions of religion,
and 2) in privacy cases, the Court has shaped the right of privacy
so that now it is one's right to make certain personal decisions
for oneself.'1 '
The upshot of these assertions is that in the fundamental
rights jurisprudence of the nation's courts, there is a discernable
(if unarticulated) movement toward recognition of a holistic con-
cept of personal liberty, existing independently of the labels one
would attach to it. More force is given to this when it is recalled
that the constitution itself rests on a block of individualism and
personal autonomy."'
2. Hair Length-The Right to Govern One's Personal
Appearance
In Teterud v. Burns 3 an incarcerated Cree Indian challenged
the constitutional validity of certain prison regulations which
limited the length at which inmates could wear their hair. The
plaintiff challenged the regulations as violative of his first amend-
ment rights under the free exercise clause." Wearing his hair long
was a religious act for the plaintiff, but the prison regulation
imposed sanctions on him for doing so. The court agreed with him
and voided the prison regulation."' The plaintiff's control of his
personal appearance warranted constitutional protection. There
have been several lower federal court cases holding similarly."6
There are many decisions in which precisely the same con-
' See notes 30-39 supra and accompanying text.
' ee notes 4-18 supra and accompanying text.
"I 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
", Id. at 359.
Id. at 362.
Wright v. Raines, 457 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Kan. 1978); Geller v. Secretary
of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1976); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1071 n.
5 (Alaska 1979) (collecting cases).
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duct involved in Teterud has been held to be protected on grounds
other than free exercise, namely, on due process or privacy
grounds."7 These cases"8 have no discernible trend."' Important-
ly, however, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a liberty in-
terest in personal appearance in Kent v. Dulles."' The Court there
declared a constitutional right to travel and noted that such right
"may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of
what he eats, or wears, or reads." 2'
The Court has since refused to interpret broadly this dictum
in Kent v. Dulles. In Kelley v. Johnson" police department rules
limiting an officer's right to control his personal appearance
(specifically, his hair length) were held constitutionally valid.
Justice Marshall dissented forcefully in Kelley"' arguing that a
denial of plaintiffs right to govern his personal appearance unfet-
tered by the government would be "fundamentally inconsistent
with the values of privacy, self identity, autonomy, and personal
liberty that.., the Constitution was designed to protect."" This
is remarkably similar to the court's finding in Teterud v. Burns" 5
that the plaintiffs religious practice of wearing his hair at a
desired length helped develop "his sense of identity and self
respect .... 126
That the Supreme Court in Kelley upheld the police depart-
ment hair length regulation there challenged in no way shuts the
door to such constitutional claims. There are a great many of these
cases,12 with a like number of factual permutations. Kelley itself
was not intended to lay down a hard and fast rule.'28 Thus it is
safe to say that the abundance of lower federal court rulings on
the issue still have significance.
" See Recent Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702 (1971); Comment, Public Schools,
Long Hair, and the Constitution, 55 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1970).
"' Compare Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) with Karr
v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
"' See TRIBE, supra note 39, at 962.
357 U.S. 116 (1958). See also Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone,
1976 DUKE L.J. 699 n.2.
121 357 U.S. at 125-26.
12 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
"I Id. at 249 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'1 Id. at 251.
12 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 361 n.11.
'= See supra note 117.
"2, 425 U.S. at 249.
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Most of these cases proceded on the theory that the govern-
ment, by attempting to control one's hair length, was violating
the plaintiffs right to liberty under the due process clause under
the fourteenth amendment,"s or in the same vein, violating the
plaintiff's penumbral right to privacy identified in Griswold v.
Connecticut.13 Other courts have analyzed the asserted right to
govern personal appearance with reference to the ninth
amendment."'
These hairlength cases are not as important for their deci-
sion on the issue of the right to be hirsute as they are for their
recognition that one's personal appearance is intimately bound
up with one's self-image, personal identity, and, in the broader
sense, with the notion of individualism on which every claim of
constitutional liberty is founded. One court has noted that the
differences between the analytical approaches available to decide
one's right to engage in conduct fundamental to personal identity
"are in considerable measure more semantic than real, and that
there is indeed a common theme in all these cases."'' 2 If this
judicially-recognized idea of commonality can exist in cases in
which the right to govern personal appearance obtains under the
banner of due process liberty,1" constitutional privacy,"' or the
ninth amendment,' 5 then certainly it can exist in cases in which
the same right is sought to be protected under the aegis of free
exercise 36 or the grounds just mentioned.
The cases dealing with hair length are the same as the cases
dealing with drug use. In neither is there a functional distinction
between personal liberty and a privacy based claim of personal
liberty. Where the plaintiff claims the right to engage in certain
conduct "fundamental to what it means to be human at a given
"' Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
'" Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969).
M Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
"' Stull v. School Bd. of W. Beaver Jr. - Sr. High School, 459 F.2d 339, 347
(3d Cir. 1972). In Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286
(M.D. Fla. 1971), the court upheld the plaintiffs right to wear his hair at his chosen
length, and in so doing stated: "[w]hether this right is characterized as protected
by the First Amendment .... the Ninth Amendment .... or the Fourteenth
Amendment ... is of no import:' 322 F. Supp. at 304.
'' Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (8th Cir. 1971).
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
'' See supra note 116.
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time and place,""' 7 it helps to understand the interests at stake
when one remembers that the liberty asserted stems from a com-
mon source, deserving protection even though not easily conform-
able to precedent.
3. The Right to Control Disclosure to the Government of
Personal Information About Oneself
In Whalen v. Roe," the Supreme Court decided that it was
constitutionally permissible for New York to keep computerized
records on persons who had been lawfully prescribed certain drugs
for which there was arguably an unlawful use or market. The plain-
tiffs there alleged that the state statutory scheme invaded "a con-
stitutionally protected 'zone of privacy'.""9 The Court expressly
acknowledged the two distinct types of privacy interests discussed
earlier:140 " ... the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and ... the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.""' The plaintiffs theorized
that the state's possession of records of their lawful use of other-
wise proscribed substances created a grave risk that such infor-
mation could become known publicly, and adversely affect their
reputations."' The Court rejected these privacy claims, holding
that while the privacy interests of the plaintiffs were legitimate,
there was an insufficient threat to either interest to warrant a
holding of constitutional infirmity."'
Now consider Stevens v. Berger.' Here the plaintiffs sought
to bar state and federal welfare agencies from ceasing payment
of benefits. The theory was that the agencies were violating the
free exercise clause and the right to privacy by requiring plain-
" TRIBE, supra note 39, at 892.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
' Id. at 599. See also McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1980); Doe
v. Sharp, 491 F. Supp. 346 (D. Mass. 1980).
140 See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
1 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
"' Id. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
4 Id. at 603. But see Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 482 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1975):
"It would seem that the right to privacy should encompass a substantial measure
of freedom for the individual to choose for himself the extent to which the govern-
ment could divulge information about him."
'" 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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tiffs to furnish their children's social security numbers as a con-
dition to continued receipt of public assistance benefits."'
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the use of social secur-
ity numbers was a device of the Antichrist,1" and that if they
were required to furnish them to the government, they would be
barred from entering Heaven.147 The court felt the first amend-
ment claim to be a sufficient ground for decision of the case and
thus found it unnecessary to examine the privacy claim.148
The court employed traditional free exercise analysis examin-
ing the sincerety'" and centrality"' of plaintiffs religious convic-
tions, and found that they were adequate to warrant the court's
balancing of them against countervailing governmental interests.'
The plaintiffs claim was upheld because the government's attempt
to sanction refusal to divulge this information violated the plain-
tiff's right to free exercise of religion.',2
These cases represent another instance in which courts were
asked to decide claims based on practically identical conduct, and
on nominally different constitutional guarantees. There must be
an essential similarity between these constitutional rights if they
can be independently asserted to protect the same conduct. There-
",S Id. at 897. Plaintiffs subjected to the requirements of section 402(a)25 of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. S 402(a)25 (1976), which required disclosure
of the numbers.
"I Id. After tracing the historical basis of belief in the Antichrist, the court
noted:
Since having a social security number in this society has become a prere-
quisite for so many of the society's benefits (both from the public and
private sectors), no great leap of imagination is necessary to travel from
the exegesis of Revelation to the plaintiffs' belief that such numbers
could function, if the state were to become too powerful, like the mark
of the Antichrist spoken of in the biblical text. With the history and
literature marshalled by plaintiffs to support their contention, their belief
must be characterized as religious for purposes of this case.
Id. at 905.
1417 Id.
. Id. at 899.
", United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
TRIBE, supra, note 39, at 859.
"' Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 905.
"' Id. at 908. Accord Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g,
479 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Cf. Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710,
159 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979).
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fore, because a court decided on one hand that freedom from dis-
closure of information may be constitutionally protected by privacy
rights, as in Whalen"' and on the other hand by the free exercise
guarantee, as in Stevens," the theories the courts used to achieve
their decisions may be in reality "verbal variations of the same
constitutional rights."'5 The rights perforce have the same func-
tion if they protect the same conduct.
4. Family Integrity--The Constitutional Right of the Family
to Conduct Itself Without Governmental Interference
The most seminal of the Supreme Court's decisions on fun-
damental rights is Meyer v. Nebraska.'56 There the Court held un-
constitutional the government's attempts to intrude on the pro-
vince of the family to educate children as it wishes.5 7 Similarly,
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"5 the Court invalidated state laws
prohibiting children from attending other than public schools. 9
These cases are among the first to draw the contours of the rights
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. They rest entirely on grounds of substantive due process."
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 6 the Court was confronted with a
similar factual situation. Members of the Old Order Amish de-
nomination challenged the constitutionality of state compulsory
school attendance laws.'" They claimed that governmentally com-
pelled school attendance violated their rights under the first and
fourteenth amendments." The Court sustained the contentions
of the religious claimants.
153 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 606 (concurring opinion).
"' Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Accord Callahan v.
Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g, 479 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
15 Runyon v. McRary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 n.15 (1976).
' 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
151 Id. at 403.
15 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
1 Id. at 519.
See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 937-43 (1973). This note does not propose to criticize the analyses used
by the Supreme Court in deciding constitutional challenges to governmental restric-
tions on economic as opposed to other manifestations of liberty. See BERGER,
GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY 268 n.89 (1977); see also note 42 supra and accompanying
text.
161 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
112 Id. at 207.
163 Id.
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Yoder was decided upon the same grounds that Meyer and
Pierce were decided, that is, that the family is in most cases
beyond the pale of governmental interference.' Significantly,
however, Yoder also rested on the free exercise guarantee.", Pierce
was factually almost identical to Yoder and could very easily have
been decided on the free exercise theory.166
When highly similar conduct is held deserving of constitutional
protection whether under the aegis of one or the other constitu-
tional right, something important is said about the nature of these
rights. The rights must in essence be the same. When the Supreme
Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut,"6 ' it cited Meyer and Pierce
to support its creation of the "emanational" or "penumbral" right
of constitutional privacy.'68 And in Runyon v. McRary69 the Court
noted that "The Meyer-Pierce-Yoder 'parental' right of privacy,
while dealt with separately ... may be no more than verbal varia-
tions of a single constitutional right.""' Likewise, Griswold, and
the Meyer-Pierce-Yoder combination of rights, may be no more
than free exercise cases in disguise:
Like religious beliefs, belief [in the areas of marriage, procrea-
tion and child rearing] are often deeply held, involving loyalties
fully as powerful as those that bind the citizen to the state. Deci-
sions on these matters tend to affect the quality of an entire
lifetime, and may not easily be reversed. The choice of whom
to marry or whether or not to have a child, once taken, will
have as strong an impact on the life patterns of the individuals
involved for years to come as any adoption of a religious belief
or viewpoint. Decisions of families in the area of 'privacy' like
decisions of individuals in the area of religion, cannot easily be
controlled by the state; and the devices needed for effective en-
forcement of state policy may themselves be so intrusive as to
'' Id. at 232-33. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
'c' Id. at 219.
'W Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. ll. 1979); Pierce involved the right
of parents to educate their children at private religious schools. 268 U.S. 510
(1935); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233.
"1 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In fact, although Griswold is best known for its crea-
tion of the penumbral right to privacy, later decisions, such as Carey v. Popula-
tion Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), make it clear that "the teaching of Griswold
is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of child bearing
from unjustified intrusion by the State." 431 U.S. at 687.
iu Id. at 484.
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Id. at 178 n.15 (emphasis added).
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be deeply offensive. At the same time, the impact of an individ-
uars decisions on questions of marriage, procreation and child
rearing diminishes greatly beyond the setting of the family itself,
just as most religious practices affect primarily those who adopt
and engage in them.1 71
This is especially tenable when it is recalled that current free
exercise doctrine embraces the functional definition of religion,
and includes in its sphere of protection conduct not ordinarily
thought of as religious.172
These cases giving constitutional protection to the integrity
of the family depict another factual pattern where the free exer-
cise guarantee and the right of privacy seem to be used inter-
changeably as case theories. This interchangeability in turn sup-
ports the hypothesis that at the heart of the analysis used by
a court deciding issues of constitutional liberty is a monolithic
freedom entwined in the political theory of the constitution.
1 3
III. CONCLUSION
The key to understanding the tensions involved in the con-
flict between government and the individual is in understanding
the political theory on which the source of our legal liberty, the
constitution, is based. That is why it becomes important to incor-
porate into our understanding of constitutional law the thought
of John Locke, and his idea of the social contract.
The constitution, and specifically the Bill of Rights, has been
viewed here as an image of the vast body of liberty intended by
the Framers to have been reserved to the people. 174 The theoretical
overlap 175 between the privacy and the free exercise cases is one
vehicle for demonstrating that view.
Nicholas L. DiVita
' Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics,
53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 773-74 (1973).
72 See, e.g., note 4 supra and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 4-18 and accompanying text; See also note 89 supra and
cases therein.
171 See generally Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31
COLUM. L. REv. 56 (1931); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Con-
stitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 249 (1928).
"I Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981): the "area of overlap"
alluded to by this Note is "presumed protected."
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